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ABSTRACT
The most common form of storage media utilized in both commercial and domestic systems is
the hard disk drive, consequently these devices feature heavily in digital investigations. Hard
disk drives are a collection of complex components. These components include hardware and
firmware elements that are essential for the effective operation of the drive. There are now a
number of devices available, intended for data recovery, which can be used to manipulate the
firmware components contained within the drive. It has been previously shown that it is
possible to alter firmware for malicious purposes, either to conceal information or to prevent
the drive’s correct operation. We review the general construction of a hard disk drive. In
particular we examine the error handling process present within hard disk drives for dealing
with failed or failing sectors and detail how this can be manipulated. The potential forensic
impact on an investigation of manipulating firmware is then explored. We propose best
practice considerations when analyzing a hard drive where firmware manipulation is
suspected and detail a possible method to detect this form of modification.
Keywords: Hard Disk, Steganography, Data Recovery, Firmware.
INTRODUCTION
The hard disk drive remains one of the most common storage devices and therefore commonly
features in digital investigations. There are numerous papers discussing best evidential practice and a
substantial number of procedures, including the Association of Chief Police Officers Guidelines
(ACPO 2008) in the UK and the Department of Justice, Prosecuting Computer Crimes guidelines in
the USA (DoJ 2007). These guidelines clearly consider hard drive media and define best practice
processes and procedures for the collection and general analysis of digital evidence. However, in
specific cases where a technically competent suspect has access to particular data recovery hardware
and software, there is the potential for the various hard disk drive firmware implementations to be
manipulated for malicious purposes. This can allow the user to have the capacity to conceal
information on the drive and place this data beyond forensic recovery using standard tools and
techniques. There is also the potential for the drive to be sabotaged by these tools and by possible
future forms of malware, prohibiting any form of forensic analysis. Therefore, there is a need for an
investigator to understand some of the processes that can be undertaken to recover data from a
damaged disk drive and also the potential for these techniques to be misused allowing the concealment
of potential evidence. This enables the investigator to comprehend the forensic significance / impact
of data recovery techniques.
HARD DISK DRIVE FUNCTIONALITY
A hard disk drive is a complex device composed of platters, voice coils, read / write heads, casing,
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mountings, a motor and a printed circuit controller board. These are manufactured in a number of form
factors, the most common being the 3.5 inch and 2.5 inch disks found in desktop and laptop systems
respectively. The data storage area is composed of a stack of metal, ceramic or glass platters coated
with a magnetic film. Each disk surface has a separate armature and head assembly. One rotation of
the disk at a particular radius is known as a track. For sets of surfaces, a set of tracks at the same radius
is known as a cylinder. The sector is the smallest addressable unit, typically containing 512 bytes of
data. A specific sector address can be found using the cylinder address (C) the Head (H) and the Sector
(S). At a higher level of abstraction the Logical Block Address (LBA) method assigns a sequential
number to each sector.
The main hard disk drive manufacturers now offer drives with a maximum capacity of around 2TB.
Once the drive has been formatted and contains a file system, the capacity is somewhat reduced. Not
all areas of the disk are addressable by the host computers operating system as shown in Figure One.
In addition to the user addressable space, there are areas of the drive that are used for the manufacturer
to record data. These include the Host Protected Area (HPA) used for holding diagnostics and other
utilities required by the PC manufacturer (Gupta et al 2006) and the Device Configuration Overlay
(DCO), either or both of which can exist on a hard disk. The Device Configuration Overlay (DCO) is
similar to the HPA, but is used by manufacturers to configure drive sizes and may exist at the same
time. An excellent overview of the HPA and DCO are provided in Carrier (2005).

Figure One: Overview of Disk Data Storage Areas
The firmware area / system area of the drive is not accessible during the normal operation of the drive
and subsequently is not addressable by the average user or the operating system. An initial portion of
the drive firmware is present on the PCB controller board. This is then responsible for loading the
platter resident firmware / system area which facilitates full operation. Disk firmware controls all
aspects of the internal hard drive operation. The firmware controls the disk startup / self-check
sequence when the system is powered on, placing the drive in a ready state that allows the host
computer to load an operating system. During operation the firmware ensures the correct operation of
the hard drive, allowing it to correctly interact with other components on the system (e.g. the operating
system).
FIRMWARE OPERATIONS
The firmware in the majority of drives consists of a series of modules; P-list, G-list, SMART
Attributes and U-List (Firmware Zone Translator). Each of these performs a key function. An example
function is defect control, no disk is manufactured without flaws and there will be some sectors on the
drive that cannot be used. At the time of production these flaws are recorded in the disk firmware as
the ‘P’ (permanent / primary / production) list. As the disk ages and through wear & tear other sectors
may fail; this is recorded in the ‘G’ (growth) list. Reads and writes are automatically redirected
(remapped) to spare sectors, see Figure Two below.
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P-list and G-list sectors are automatically bypassed by the drive electronics and so do not slow down
drive sector access times. By adding or removing a sector from the P-list and/or G-list, we have the
ability to hide/make-visible data on the hard-drive.

Figure Two: G-list Remapping
This process is transparently handled by the disk and occurs ‘beneath’ the operating system via the
two lists, P-list and G-list (Blyth et al 2008). The firmware in these disks may fail. The G-list may
become full on some disk models and as a result the disk may stop working. An error in the firmware
can prevent the disk being accessed while still physically healthy and all user data remaining intact.
FORENSIC IMPACT
In a previous paper (Sutherland et al 2009) we have examined the possibility of steganography and
data hiding via the manipulation of disk firmware. This paper addresses the issues of the possible
forensics impact of these techniques on forensic practice and procedure. The possibility of attacking
systems via firmware distribution and the use of microcode exploits has also been discussed by Zhou
et al (2009).
To date there are only a limited number tools available tools to perform repair or modifications on
firmware. There are a number of free / shareware tools that claim to read some portions of the
firmware, usually disk model / serial number (Browsedata 2004). But these tools do not facilitate
sufficient control over the firmware to make repairs or exploits possible. In terms of commercial
products the authors are aware of two systems available for this type of analysis and repair. Both
systems comprise a combination of hardware and software tools. One particularly sophisticated tool
originates in Russia and costs in the region of $4000. The full Russian tool suite includes the ability to
extract data and work with some solid-state devices and SCSI disks is in the region of $15,000. A
more readily available device is offered from China and can be obtained via resellers in Europe for
around $350 per disk manufacturer. Either of these tools would enable a competent user to manipulate
firmware to conceal data or code from the hard disk dive itself.
There are a number of possible scenarios where this technology could be misused. An individual may
use disk firmware steganography to conceal information within the drive, either by using the firmware
defect control system or by the manipulation of bad sectors (Blyth et al 2008, Sutherland et al 2009).
Another possibility is the use of malware on the drive to prevent the disk ever operating correctly
again by attacking unique critical elements of the firmware, denying a user or forensic investigator
access to any data. This kind of exploit would be developed and targeted at particular disks and
systems and would act as a sophisticated method of sabotage that could render the drive contents
irrecoverable.
Firmware manipulation can have a significant impact on the forensic process. Data that has been
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hidden using firmware steganography techniques will not appear for analysis in a traditional forensic
image. In the event of malware targeting and corrupting the firmware, this will prohibit any forensic
images to be acquired from the hard disk drive. As previously outlined, this type of manipulation is
not detected by the current suite of forensics tools and so requires both specialised tools and training to
detect. However, an investigator having been trained in this area and in possession of the correct
equipment is still faced with a number of problems.
In the case of determining if the disk firmware has been tampered with, either to conceal information
or as a result of malware targeting and corrupting the firmware, the investigator would need to be able
to assess the validity of the firmware. This process has a number of challenges: each family of drives
is unique so the investigator would need to evaluate the drive against a comparable disk and perhaps
use key firmware modules, even hardware components, from the donor drive to verify the firmware is
valid or to enable the repair of the original drive to a fully functional state to allow forensic analysis.
The ability to do this work would require a substantial library of firmware / donor drives for
comparison and replacement of failed mechanical parts. This library would be difficult to build, as
often donor drives are difficult to obtain and match due to strict compatibility criteria, which changes
dramatically by manufacturer.
In a previous paper (Sutherland et al 2009), the authors examined and highlighted the possibility to
manipulate the firmware, via the defect control system i.e. the error lists; the P-list and G-list. If a
malicious attempt has been made to manipulate the error lists then an LBA has been remapped to a
reserve location on the drive and subsequently altered. This presents a situation where the original
‘bad’ sector contains one piece of information and the remapped sector may contain different
information, this maybe due to time factors i.e. the original file copied has been overwritten and
replaced with another file, or, direct editing of the information contained at those remapped LBA
addresses has been done purposely. This can be achieved via a hex editor by zeroing out the hex
values that correspond to the LBA number or saving an alternate file to that LBA location, overwriting
the copy of the original data (see Figure Three below).

Figure Three: G-list Forensic Impact
In this situation the user and most forensic tools would see and access the data at the remapped
sectors, not the original contents. It is possible using advanced data recovery tools and techniques for
the investigator to still access the original location and data, regardless of whether it was a genuine
system shift or the cause of system manipulation. In this case, in attempting to access these areas the
investigator will have to work on, and alter, the original media, which would require changes to best
practice procedure.
Detecting this form of misuse is potentially difficult. The major problem lies in the ability to obtain
and verify the error lists. The error lists and certain portions of the data contained in the firmware /
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system area are unique and disk model specific and therefore cannot be compared to another version
of the disk. A donor drive with matching firmware is required and this can still differ in parts
somewhat. However, it is possible to return the hard disk drive back to it’s original ‘factory settings’
with regards to the original list of all available physical sectors that can be used by the disk, whilst still
retaining user data. This would enable the investigator to access and forensically analyse all the
original sectors. Advanced data recovery tools would be necessary to facilitate the manipulation of the
defect control system and also adjust the hard disk drive read / write parameters, enabling the retrieval
of data from all sectors regardless of whether they are legitimate bad sectors, as these sectors have not
yet ultimately failed but have been marked as bad by the system and discontinued from service.
To access all original CHS locations that were available at the time of manufacture, the G-list module
for the defect management system would have to be fully cleared. Carrying out this action would
allow the retrieval of any data that may have been maliciously hidden via the firmware steganographic
technique previously devised. However, all data that has been saved to the reserved sector area will
have been lost at this point, which would result in the loss of potential evidence data.
FORENSIC BEST PRACTICE
These types of malicious techniques have the potential to impact upon forensic best practice. There are
two possible alternatives when proposing best practice for this type of analysis. The first is to assume
that this type of analysis is required in each case, clearly this would be prohibitively expensive, time
consuming and unnecessary in the vast majority of cases. The second option is to apply this type of
analysis when the evidence indicates the possibility of firmware tampering. The latter would have to
be indicated by a combination of the suspect’s technical expertise, the presence of certain hardware
and software tools at the scene and suspected incomplete or missing evidential material.
Where there are grounds for suspecting that a suspect may have modified drive firmware, then there
are a number of actions that could be constituted as best practice in this type of case. At the crime
scene this impacts the seizing of any computer equipment. Any products that have data recovery
branding or related documentation need to be seized. The functionality of the device needs to be
examined to determine if it has the capability to perform such exploits, informing the subsequent
direction of the investigation. If data recovery products are recovered then the following
recommendations are made:
Firstly, provided the hard disk drive is functioning correctly and allows access to the user data, a
standard image of the drive should be acquired as a baseline for further detailed investigation. All hard
disk drives will develop legitimate bad sectors due to natural wear and tear, these bad sectors will
invoke reserved space into service and data will be remapped to this area as previously discussed.
Over time it is likely the data at those LBA locations will change, so an alternative copy cannot be
guaranteed. For this reason it is necessary to obtain a baseline image first with which to work from,
otherwise, further firmware modifications will prevent access to this reserve area and its data resulting
in the loss of potential evidence.
Secondly, once a baseline image has been created, it is suggested that the investigator should use data
recovery tools and techniques to reset the dynamic defect list, the G-list, clearing its contents, which
would re-align all of the original LBA numbers to their CHS counterparts. After the realignment has
been successfully completed it is crucial that the hard disk drive read parameters are altered, allowing
the drive more time to read from all sectors. If this is not altered, the disk may encounter problems
when reading the sector and re-mark the sector as failed, subsequently not acquiring any data. This is
important as malicious users may take the extra step to not only hide data in physical sectors not
accessible by the disk itself, but also to hide data in legitimate failing locations, so that if the defect G
list was re-set, the data would still not be fully obtainable due to default drive read time configuration.
The proposed method would allow a comparison of data between the two images. The first forensic
image of the drive would contain all data residing in the user data area and in the reserved area; the
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second would contain all data from the user area. This would contain all the data in the original
physical sectors of the drive that were mapped out due to natural wear and tear, and or through
suspected manipulation of the firmware to conceal data. Best practise would then be to separate the
duplicated data as much as possible from the two images, highlighting the differences. This could be
achieved by creating a known file filter from the first image. This could be facilitated via MD5 or
SHA-1 hash recognition systems, and could then be used to disregard all known files from the second
image, leaving the variations to be analysed in a separate environment from that of the first original
forensic image. Both images together would then make up a complete copy of all data contained on
the drive, allowing a comprehensive forensic investigation to be performed.
Where the suspect may be in the possession of data recovery hardware and software tools and in the
event of the drive not responding to any forensic imaging attempts, there is the possibility that the
drive has been purposely sabotaged via firmware corruption methods. The drive may possibly be
repaired; it would depend upon the type of corruption and the model of hard disk drive itself, as all
have differing firmware implementations. Best practice would be to use advanced data recovery tools
and techniques to firstly diagnose the exact form of firmware or hardware corruption. This will
provide an indication as to how the drive was damaged and also how to proceed with the recovery. It
is possible that some repairs can be made with data recovery tools without the use of donor disk
drives. The drive can then be imaged via standard practise, taking into account the above mentioned
current best practise method to gain access to all areas of data.
In other cases where donor drives are required to enable repair, the investigator would have to source a
suitable donor hard disk drive and begin the recovery using the original diagnosis as a starting point. If
full recovery of the disk and the file system cannot be achieved, it is possible to recover some data
through standard data carving techniques e.g. Scalpel. (Richard III & Roussev 2005) Advanced data
carving techniques would enable the investigator to carve out tangible user and or system files from
the raw data available. The proposed two part imaging method outlined above would be have to be
implemented to facilitate carving from all data areas.
Malware engineered to target hard disk firmware can in theory render a full acquisition of the data
contained on the drive very difficult to achieve even with sophisticated data recovery tools and donor
parts. This could be due to the malware targeting disk specific critical subsystems contained in the
firmware, damaging the drive. This is an area for further research. The drive in this scenario would not
be able to reach a ‘ready’ state and the firmware / system area would be inaccessible for diagnosis and
repair. In this case the investigator should attempt to use advanced data recovery techniques, which
may be able to achieve a ‘ready’ state. One example of such a technique would be to emulate the
service area of a matched donor disk on to the hard disk needing to be recovered, in some cases
enabling access to the firmware so repairs could be made, again, if possible.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
There are a number of potential problems relating to the forensic analysis of malicious hard disk
firmware modification. Without the correct knowledge of the systems it can be very difficult to find or
reverse this type of modification. Hardware and software costs supporting this type of analysis are
significant. The correct training is not widely available and is expensive. While this remains unlikely
to impact the vast majority of forensic cases, the increasing availability of the data recovery tools used
to carry out this work makes it a possible area for future concern. In this paper the forensic impacts of
such hard disk firmware exploits have been discussed and suggested current best practice has been put
forward for the correct handling of such cases.
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